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In the Sttpreme Cottrt of the 
State of Utah 
BERT E. HARRIS, )\ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. \ 
VIRGINIA WILSTEAD, ~) 
Defendant and Respondent. 
I 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case 
No. 7182 
Since the plaintiff appeals upon the judgment roll only, 
and the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, findings of fact, 
and conclusions of law to support the judgment are before 
this Court on this appeal, we deem it wise to state fully the 
allegations of the pleadings and the issues drawn thereun-
der. 
The complaint sets forth the check and alleges that 
defendant made and delivered same to plaintiff for a "valu-
able consideration"; that it was endorsed by plaintiff, pre-
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sented to the Bank for payment; that the Bank refused pay-
ment for the reason that defendant had stopped payment 
thereon; that plaintiff is the owner and holder of the check, 
no part of which has been paid, and prays for the recovery 
of $4,000,00, together with interest. 
The defendant in her answer admits the execution of 
the check, but denies its delivery and that it was given for 
a "valuable consideration." In her further answer and de-
fense the defendant alleges that there were "negotiations" 
between the parties for the sale of the real property situa-
ted at 394 North Third West in Provo on June 27, 1947; 
that an oral understanding was then reached by them con-
cerning the sale of his premises; that pursuant to same de-
fendant was to give her $4,000.00 check, payable to plain-
tiff, as part payment, and plaintiff was to hold same until 
July 1, 1947; that meanwhile plaintiff was to use the check 
for the purpose of exhibiting it to some Idaho people to as-
sure them that he could finance a deal for other property 
there as soon as he closed the deal on his Provo property; 
that plaintiff further agreed to furnish title evidence on the 
Provo property for defendant's examination, and procure 
a statement of the mortgage indebtedness thereon from 
Provo Building and Loan Society; and that the check was 
made and delivered to plaintiff pursuant to this oral under-
standing. The defendant further alleges that after the 
said oral agreement was made, on the same day and after 
banking hours, the plaintiff violated same by attempting 
to negotiate the check; and that defendant, for her own pro-
tection, stopped payment on the check the following day. 
Defendant further alleges that plaintiff failed to perform 
his said oral agreement, and that there has been and there 
is a complete failure of consideration. No demurrer was 
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ever filed by plaintiff to defendant's answer, and its suffi-
ciency was not questioned until after the trial. 
Upon these pleadings the issues drawn were two-fold: 
(1) Was the delivery of the check conditional within the 
meaning of 61-1-17, U. C. A., 1943, and (2) Was there a 
failure of consideration, or any consideration at all, for the 
check in suit? If the delivery of the check was con-
ditional and the condition broken, then it follows that the 
instrument never took effect, and was effectively revoked 
by defendant's stop order. Also, it should be noted that 
if the contemplated contract of sale was never entered into 
between the parties, then the only possible consideration of 
the check failed. 
After trial of these issues the lower court took the mat-
ter under advisement and counsel for the parties submitted 
briefs in support of their respective positions. While the 
case thus sub~tted was under advisement, plaintiff filed 
a "Motion for Judgment," which was denied, and he here 
assails that action as error. The plaintiff also attacks the 
findings of the lower court in that ( 1) The Court refused 
to make findings which plaintiff contends were material 
and should have been made, (2) That the Court made find-
ings which plaintiff contends were erroneous, and (3) That 
the Court made findings outside the issues upon which 
plaintiff contends the judgment was based. 
THE ARGUMENT 
The appeal is upon the judgment roll only. No Bill of 
Exceptions was filed, and the evidence is not before this 
Court. The only concern of this Court on this appeal, 
therefore, is the inquiry whether the pleadings, findings of 
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fact, and conclusions of law support the judgment. Gray 
v. Defa 103 U\. 339, 135 P2d, 251; Sandall v. Hoskins, 104 
U. 50, 137 P2d. 819. And in the absence of a Bill of Ex-
ceptions, the presumption is that the Court's findings are 
in strict conformity with the evidence produced at the trial. 
Henroid v. East Tintic Development Co., 52 U. 245, 173 P. 
134. 
In the light of the foregoing rules of law, it is inter-
esting to note that counsel at the conclusion of their brief 
seem to ask this Court for judgment on the pleadings. All 
of their assignments of error require a review and consid-
eration of the evidence which is not before this Court. We 
shall, nevertheless, discuss our position relative to this ap-
peal in the same order as the assignments are set forth in 
plaintiff's brief. 
1. THE COURT COMMI'ITED NO ERROR IN OV-
ERRULING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in overruling 
his Motion for Judgment, and grounds his position upon the 
proposition that the answer does not plead facts sufficient 
to constitute a defense to the plaintiff's complaint, and that 
same is insufficient in law to constitute a want or failure 
of consideration. He argues that because of these conten-
tions, the pleadings, findings and conclusions are insifficient 
to sustain judgment. 
At the outset, attention is called to the fact that no 
contract for the sale of the plaintiff's home was pleaded. 
The plaintiff sued on the $4,000.00 check. Defendant's 
answer alleges that the check was never delivered for the 
purpose of becoming effective until certain conditions al-
leged in the answer were complied with, and that upon the 
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conditions being broken, no contract for the sale of the 
home ever came into existence, and therefore that the con-
sideration failed. We have set forth in some detail allega-
tions of the defendant's further answer in the above state-
ment of the pleadings. We believe that these allegations of 
the answer are sufficient and definitely raise the issues of 
"delivery" and "consideration," as above indicated. 
The law on the matter of conditional delivery is clearly 
set forth in Section 61-1-17, U. C. A., 1943, as follows: 
"Every contract on a negotiable instrument is in-
complete and revocable until delivery of the instru-
ment for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As be-
tween immediate parties, . . the delivery in or-
der to be effectual must be made by or under the au-
thority of the party . . . . drawing, etc., as the 
case may be; and in such case the delivery may be 
shown to have been conditional, or for a special pur-
pose only, and not for the purpose of transferring the 
property in the instrument . " 
Also, Section 61-1-25 provides that every negotiable in-
strument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a 
valuable consideration. It is then provided by Section 61-
1-29, as follows: 
"Absence or failure of consideration is matter of 
defense as against any person not a holder in due 
course, and partial failure of consideration is a defense 
pro tanto, whether the failure is an ascertained and 
liquidated amount or otherwise." 
It has been held by our Supreme Court that conditional 
delivery may be pleaded and that the parole evidence rule 
does not preclude its being proved. Martineau v. Hanson, 
47 U. 544, 155 P. 432. 
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Under 61-1-25 the production of the check by plaintiff 
and proof of the signature make a prima facia case for a 
valuable consideration; this places the burden on the de-
fendant of producing evidence to overcome such prima fa-
cie case; but when defendant produces such evidence, the 
burden is then on plaintiff to show by fair preponderance 
of all the evidence a legal and valuable consideration. Hud-
son v. Moon, 42 U. 377, 130 P. 774. 
Under 61-1-29, in an action by the payee of the check, 
want or failure of consideration may be shown if presen-
ted in averments contained in the answer by showing any 
arrangements entered into by the parties that is not illegal 
or unreasonable. Smith v. Brown, 50 U. 27, 165 P. 468. 
Pursuant to the foregoing law, the plaintiff introduced 
a check, offered evidence of defendant's signature and res-
ted. The presumption of consideration was indulged. 
Thereupon defendant, pursuant to her pleading, went for-
ward and offered evidence that the check was conditionally 
delivered to plaintiff for the above mentioned special pur-
pose, that it was to become effective as "part payment" on 
the home when the deal was finally consummated, that the 
conditions of the delivery were violated by the plaintiff, 
that the check was therefore revoked by the stop order, 
and that the agreement for the sale of the home never came 
into being. Under HIUdson v Moon, supra, the burden then 
shifted back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance 
of all the evidence the oral arrangements of June 27, 1947, 
in fact amounted to a valid and binding contract for the 
sale of the home in order to establish consideration. 
Our position is that if the check is supported by any 
consideration at all, it must be the same consideration that 
supported the alleged contract for the sale of the home. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
If the contract failed, the consideration for the check failed 
also. The consideration for the check is not, as counsel 
seemed to suggest in their brief, the agreement of plaintiff 
to hold same until July 1, 1947. That agreement, together 
with the promise to make use of the check in exhibiting 
same to give assurance to the Idaho purchasers, consti-
tuted the conditional delivery. The only possible consider-
ation was to show a valid contract for the sale of the home. 
Counsel's point that defendant's answer is insufficient 
as a matter of law to establish want or failure of considera-
tion is unsound and unsupported. Under the doctrine of 
Smith v. Brown, supra, we alleged facts showing that the 
check was given when the deal was yet in the negotiations 
stage; that the contract could not be consummated until 
July 1, 1947, that the delivery was conditional, that the 
conditions were broken, that there was a revocation of the 
check by the stop order, that the contract for the sale of 
the home never came into being, and that the consideration 
for the check failed entirely. 
Attention is called to the fact that the defendant's ans-
wer does not contain the bald conclusion of law that "there 
was no consideration given by plaintiff for the check," as 
contended for by counsel. The allegations of defendant's 
further answer, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 thereof, summarized 
above, fully set forth the two defenses, to-wit: conditional 
delivery and failure of consideration. And all of the said 
facts are tied to and a part of the plea of failure of con-
sideration as evidenced by the concluding phrase: "And 
that there has been, as hereinabove alleged, a failure of any 
and all consideration for said check, and there is no con-
sideration for same." The case of Smith v. Brown, supra, 
contained a similar situation in that both the defenses of 
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conditional delivery and failure of consideration were made 
by the answer. In that case, also, the contention was made 
that the averments of the answer were insufficient to raise 
these defenses. This Court there said: 
"While the answer is somewhat inartificially 
drawn and several defenses are intermingled, yet, when 
the averments contained therein are considered and 
are given the liberal construction required by our stat-
ute, the answer is sufficient to permit the defendant 
to prove the . facts:" Utah Rep. 31. 
"Now, under the averments in the answer, it was 
relevant to prove that in consideration that the defen-
dant should manage and conduct the business of the 
corporation he was not to become personally liable to 
the plaintiff for the purchase price of the capital stock 
issued in defendant's name, and that the plaintiff, in 
order to compensate himself for the amount he had 
advanced for that stock, should receive the profits un-
til he was fully repaid the purchase price of that stock. 
Such an agreement, if entered into, certainly was not 
illegal nor unreasonable." Utah Rep. 33. 
It should be remembered that the plaintiff filed no de-
murrer to the defendant's answer or otherwise attacked 
same before or during the trial. Indeed, no attack was 
made on the sufficiency of the answer to raise the issues 
therein set forth uritil the plaintiff moved for judgment aft-
er trial and submission of the cause for decision by the 
Court. The case was tried on the assumption by both 
court and counsel that the defense of failure of considera-
tion had been raised by the pleadings. After defendant had 
offered evidence tending to rebut the presumption of con-
sideration, it then became incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
offer evidence to show that the check was supported by 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
consideration. The only way plaintiff could do this was to 
offer evidence of the oral agreement for the sale of the 
home, and that he was at all times ready, able and willing 
to perfom it. This, the plaintiff did at the trial. The Court 
found the issue against him. Plaintiff cites two cases in 
his brief in support of the contention that the answer was 
insufficient to raise the issue of consideration. Both of 
these cases make against the proposition plaintiff contends 
for. 
The first of these is Bacon v. McChrystal, 10 U;. 290. 
In that case an action for money had and received was 
brought by the buyer to recover $1,200.00 paid to the sel-
ler as part of the purchase price under a parol contract for 
the sale and purchase of land. The entire consideration for 
the land was $1,600.00. The seller did not have title to the 
land sold, and buyer demanded a return of the money paid. 
Failing to obtain it, he brought this action. About six 
weeks afterwards the seller executed a Warranty Deed in 
favor of the buyer covering the land which was embraced 
in the verbal contract and offered to deliver it to the buy-
er, provided the buyer would pay an additional $400.00, 
which the buyer refused to do. The jury found a verdict 
for the buyer, and judgment was entered for him. At the 
trial the court instructed the jury to disregard the evidence 
received showing a parol contract for the sale of land, and 
this was excepted to by the seller, and was the chief point 
relied upon on the appeal. This Court in sustaining the 
judgment of the lower court, said that before the seller 
(the party to be charged) can recover where there is a 
parol agreement for the sale of land, he must make a time-
ly offer to perform the oral contract, and used the follo~­
ing language: 
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" It is also true that the great weight of 
authority is to the effect that such an action cannot 
be maintained if the person who receives the money 
under such contract, void by the statute, offers to fully 
perform and contract on his part. In other words, if 
a person selling land by a verbal contract, as in this 
case, has a perfect title himself, and offers to convey 
it to his vendee upon demand, the vendee cannot com-
plain that the contract is void because the other party, 
who is the one that is required to be bound by writing, 
agrees to perform, and does not seek to avoid it; but 
in such case, in order that the offer to perform may 
be a defense to the action, the offer should be made in 
apt time, and should be made by some person compe-
tent to perform." 
The record, including the evidence, was apparently 
before the Court in that case, and no such offer to perform 
the oral contract having been tendered until nearly two 
months after the suit had been commenced, and that this 
was not "in apt time." 
The second case upon which counsel relies in connec-
tion with this point is that of Garbarino v. Union Savings 
& Loan Association, Colo. (1941) 109 P2d. 638. This was 
an action wherein the seller sues the buyer on a check for 
$1,000.00 drawn to the seller by the buyer and given as 
part payment on an oral contract to convey land. The 
complaint alleged that the check had been given by the buy-
er for a good and valuable consideration, payable to the 
order of the seller, and upon which the buyer later stopped 
payment. The answer set up several defenses, including 
failure of consideration and the statute of frauds, which the 
replication controverts. The evidence was conflicting and 
the case was submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict 
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in favor of the seller. The judgment based thereon was re-
viewed on this appeal. The Court in its instruction to the 
jury (see P. 641) states the same rule of law as that set 
out above in connection with the Bacon case in the follow-
ing portion of the instruction: 
" . . . You are further instructed that if you fur-
ther find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiff accepted the offer of the defendant to 
purchase said Detroit Apartments, and if you further 
find plaintiff has at all times since the acceptance of 
said offer of the defendant been ready, willing and able 
to perform said agreement for the sale of said Detroit 
Apartments to the (plaintiff) in accordance with the 
terms of said offer of the defendant, that then you 
shall find for the plaintiff." 
Furthermore, the court held in this opinion that the 
issue on which the case turned was that of consideration. 
For if the statute of frauds rendered the oral contract void, 
then the check sued on was without consideration. The 
court also held that the rule operates both ways, and in 
that connection used the following language. (SeeP. 642). 
"Obviously here the defendant (buyer) is in the 
same position, legally, as if he were seeking to recover 
$1,000.00 paid on the purchase price, instead of resist-
ing payment of the check given for such purpose." 
This makes the rule here stated applicable in the situa-
tion detailed in the Bacon case. 
It is clear then that the issue of failure of considera-
tion having been raised by the answer, both by direct denial 
of the allegation in plaintiff's complaint that it was given 
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for a "valuable consideration," as well as in defendant's 
affirmative defense that it was without consideration, the 
plaintiff had the burden to prove that he was at all times 
ready; able, and willing to perform the oral agreement. 
This, the findings show, the plaintiff failed to do. It is true 
the statute of frauds was pleaded in the Garbarino case, 
but this makes no difference, because the ultimate issue 
raised by such a plea is consideration. We conclude that 
the answer sufficiently pleads the defense of failure of con-
sideration, that same is reflected in the findings, and that 
the judgment is supported thereby. 
II. THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S RE-
FUSAL TO MAKE THE FINDINGS OF WHICH PLAIN-
TIFF COMPLAINED 
Plaintiff contends that the Court should have made 
findings on the two issues set forth in his brief. Our po-
sition is that the Court did make sufficient findings on both 
the matters complained of. There are two material issues 
raised by the pleadings. (1) That the check was condi-
tionally delivered and such conditions were violated, and 
( 2) There was a failure of consideration for the check. 
Either one of these defenses, if proved, would constitute a 
complete defense to plaintiff's complaint. The Court made 
findings of the ultimate facts on each of them. On the al-
legations in the answer concerning conditional delivery, 
namely that the check was to be held until July 1, 1947, 
and that same was to be used "for the purpose of exhibiting 
same to some people in Idaho to assure them the plaintiff 
could finance the deal for the purchase of other property 
there," the Court found as follows: 
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"4. That the aforesaid check was given by the 
defendant to the plaintiff as part of oral negotiations 
had between the parties on June 27, 1947, for the sale 
by plaintiff to defendant of a certain home and premi-
ses situated at 394 North Third West in Provo, Utah; 
that the oral tmderstanding had between the parties 
for the sale of said premises failed and was not car-
ried out, and the defendant feeling insecure stopped 
payment on the said check, as aforesaid; " 
On the allegations in the answer concerning failure of 
consideration, namely, that there was an oral contract for 
the sale of the home, that an abstract of title was to be pro-
duced, and the statement of the amount due on an existing 
mortgage on the premises, the Court found as follows: 
"4. . . . that thereafter the plaintiff failed to · 
perform the said oral understanding on his part and 
failed to tender performance or offer to perform the 
said oral agreement, and said plaintiff advertised the 
property for sale to others on July 4, 1947, without 
tendering performance to the defendant, and since Ju-· 
ly 12 said plaintiff has not been and is not now ready, 
able, and willing to convey the said premises as speci-
fied in the said oral agreement; and that the considera-
tion for the said check has completely failed, and that 
there is no consideration for same." 
We contend that finding numbre 4, above set forth, 
supports the allegations concerning both the issues, and 
they are deemed to be supported by the evidence. Much 
of plaintiff's complaint about these findings go to matters 
such as indefiniteness and uncertainty, and calls for nice 
refinements and distinctions to be made therein. As this 
Court said in Sandall v. Hoskins, supra, (See Utah Rep. p. 
56): 
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"We do not think that we should be technical in re-
quiring a court to make refined separations between 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law especially 
where the basis for the so-called finding clearly ap-
pears in the findings. Findings of Fact as we have de-
fined them mean 'ultimate facts'." 
Then follows an illuminating discussion showing how 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are neces-
sarily intermingled in reaching the ultimate finding of the 
fact. It is submitted that the finding on the crucial issue 
of failure of consideration is an ultimate finding of fact and 
such finding that the plaintiff was never willing, ready, or 
able to perform the oral contract alone amply supports the 
judgment. In any event, the requested finding of details 
as to this oral agreement was unnecessary to the decision 
of the case, and as this Court said in Cook v. Cook (1946) 
174 P2d. 434 at 437: 
"It is not necessary to make findings of fact on 
issues which can have no effect on the result." 
Finally, this being an appeal on the judgment roll on-
ly, and no evidence is before the Court, this assignment 
should not be considered. The law is stated in 8 Bancroft's 
Code Practice and Remedies, Section 6707, pp. 8890 and 
8891, as follows: 
"Where the evidence is not made a part of the 
record by bill of exceptions or substitute therefor, find-
ings are conclusive and must be accepted as correct 
. In the absence of the evidence, alleged er-
ror in failing to make certain findings, . . . or 
a contention that the findings are contrary to law or 
are not supported by the evidence will not be consid-
ered." 
Seealso Gray v. Defa and Sandall v. Hoskins, supra. 
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III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT COMPLAINED OF 
ARE NOT ERRONEOUS. 
Under this general heading the plaintiff in his brief 
breaks up paragraph 4 of the Court's finding by tearing 
therefrom the parts of it which he numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
These counsel considers separately and directs his criticism 
of same as though they stood alone and apart from each 
other as well as the balance of the findings in the para-
graph. This clearly is a violation of the basic rule con-
cerning construction of findings. The law in this regard 
is set forth in 2 Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, 
beginning Section 1699, pages 2180 and 2181, the pertinent 
parts of which are as follows: 
Section 1699. "Findings are not construed like 
pleadings, nor are they given a technical construction, 
and the words are not to be so strafned as to make out 
a case of conflict. The rule requiring liberal construc-
tion is often announced in the cases, and it is held that 
findings are sufficient if as a whole, taken together 
with the pleadings and the evidence, they justify the 
judgment rendered, even though they are wanting in 
precision. . . . . As a general rule, findings 
speak as of the date of the complaint." 
Section 1700. " . . . . It is an established 
rule, frequently applied, that findings of fact should 
be liberally construed in support of the judgment. 
Seemingly equivocal and ambiguous findings should be 
so interpreted that the judgment may be sustained; 
and if there is any doubt as to the category in which 
a deduction by a court belongs, that is, whether it is 
finding of fact or a conclusion of law, the doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the judgment. So, also, if the 
findings admit of a construction that will support the 
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judgment, that construction will be adopted rather 
than a different one that would render the judgment 
erroneous . " 
Section 1701. " . Findings must not be 
considered piecemeal or according to their numerical 
order, but in determining their sufficiency they are to 
be read as a whole and all constituent parts are con-
strued together. While, of course, surplusage may be 
rejected, some effect should ordinarily be given to each 
part of a finding, and, as thus considered, if the find~ 
ings can be made to harmonize with each other and 
the judgment, a reversal may not be had, even though 
portions of the findings when considered by themselves 
are apparently confusing and inconsistent with the 
remainder. " 
See cases cited in notes sustaining the foregoing propo-
sitions of law. 
That the plaintiff asks the Court to violate the fore-
going rule is demonstrable by reference to his points 1 and 
2 in this connection. He rips 1 out of the context of para-
graph 4 of the Court's findings "That the oral understand-
ing had between the parties for the sale of said premises 
failed and was not carried out and the defendant feeling in-
secure stopped payment on said check." Plaintiff then cri-
ticizes this finding for ambiguity, stating that it cannot be 
ascertained therefrom "whether the failure was on the part 
of the plaintiff or the defendant, or both." Then follows 
point 2, "That thereafter the plaintiff failed to perform the 
said oral understanding on his part and failed to tender per-
formance or offer to perform the said oral agreement." 
This sentence is also torn from the context of the same 
paragraph 4 of the findings, so that plaintiff directs criti-
cism to his point 1 that you cannot tell whose failure it was 
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and in point 2 he answers the criticism by setting forth the 
finding that "the plaintiff failed to perform the said oral 
understanding on his part." Even construing these frag-
mentary findings with the pleadings where the oral under-
standing is set out in detail, they clearly set forth the find-
ing of the facts without any uncertainty. But under the fore-
going rules a construction of the said finding number 4 as 
a whole leaves no doubt either about the oral understanding 
or of the plaintiff's violation thereof, and these findings sup-
port the judgment. 
The plaintiff, in his points 2 and 3, takes other frag-
ments of the Court's finding number 4 and directs his criti-
cism at them on the theory that they are findings outside 
the jssues drawn by the pleadings. We shall discuss this 
criticism under the next general heading of plaintiff's ar-
gument. In point 4 the plaintiff takes another fragment 
"that the consideration for the said check has completely 
failed, and that there is no consideration for same," and 
asks the Court to consider it as though it stood alone. We 
do not quarrel with the rule and the cases cited by plaintiff 
supporting it that the conclusion of law does not sufficiently 
plead the affirmative defense of consideration, but we con-
tend here that our affirmative answer and the Court's find-
ing number 4 alleges and finds facts constituting a valid de-
fense of failure of consideration. vVe do contend that the 
entire findings should be construed together and as a whole, 
and when this is done there is no uncertainty in either the 
pleadings or the findings as to what the defense is. As 
stated above, the Court and cou~sel for both parties con-
sidered the defense of failure of consideration had been 
raised by the pleadings and evidence was offered and re-
ceived in support thereof. Indeed, the testimony upon 
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which the finding was based was introduced by the plain-
tiff. Certainly the plaintiff cannot with good grace come 
before this Court and assail a finding made on the basis of 
testimony introduced by him at the trial and seek to have 
the Court set it aside because as he states on page 25 of his 
brief that "The testimony is not before this Court on this 
appeal; consequently, the Court has no way of determining 
whether or not there is any basis for the finding." There 
is no error in the findings made. 
IV. THE COURT MADE NO FINDINGS ON MAT-
TERS OUTSIDE OF THE ISSUES. 
The plaintiff ardently contends that the part of the 
findings assailed by him "That the plaintiff failed to tender 
performance or offer to perform the said oral agreement"; 
and "that since July 12 the said plaintiff has not been and 
is not now ready, able, and willing to convey the said premi-
ses as specified in the said oral agreement" are findings 
"completely outside of and extraneous to the issues as pre-
sented by the pleadings in this case." In view of our analy-
sis of the Bacon and the Garbarino cases herein, we are un-
able to follow the plaintiff's reasoning in this regard. As 
above indicated, consideration for the check was presumed 
and its introduction by plaintiff shifted the burden to us 
to show that the consideration failed. We offered evidence 
of the oral agreement, the conditional delivery of the check 
which was violated and the consequent failure of consider-
ation. It then became incumbent upon the plaintiff to 
prove that the check was in fact supported by considera-
tion. Thus the issue became, did the seller, the only one 
protected under the statute of frauds, tender performance 
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to the defendant by showing that he was at all times ready, 
willing, and able to perform the oral contract? This was 
a part of the whole issue of consideration for the check 
raised by the pleadings. It inhered in and was raised by the 
plea of failure of consideration. It could not get out of the 
issues thus drawn, and plaintiff himself first offered evi-
dence concerning it. The Court found against the plaintiff 
on that crucial part of the issue. 
Plaintiff raised the same point on his motion to modi-
fy the findings in the trial court as he here makes. The 
Court in its second Memorandum Decision answered the 
plaintiff's contentions as follows: 
"But plaintiff complains that that issue was never 
presented by the pleadings. Unless pleading a failure 
of consideration does so plead it, the contention is true. 
Yet assuming it is not pleaded in the allegation of fail-
ure of consideration and that a finding thus in error, 
such error could not prejudice the plaintiff. The issue 
of valuable consideration is first interjected into the 
cause in Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's complaint. It is 
denied by the defendant. The issues upon which plain-
tiff seeks findings and as enumerated above, were al-
leged by the defendant, who makes no complaint that 
there is no finding upon them. 
"Further, the testimony upon which the finding 
is based was introduced by the plaintiff himself under 
examination by his own counsel. Can he claim preju-
dice? I think not. He was in no way misled by fail-
ure of the defendant to plead it, and neither party 
asked amendment of the pleadings to conform to the 
proof." 
We agree with the Court in the matter, and fail to see 
how the plaintiff could suffer any prejudice even though 
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the matter had not been pleaded. But we contend it was 
pleaded in the failure of consideration defense. The plain-
tiff in his brief admits that the only possible consideration 
for the check was the oral agreement to convey. This be-
ing true, it was incumbent upon him to show that the oral 
, agreement was an enforceable verbal contract which would 
support and become consideration for the check. This is 
precisely what plaintiff attempted to do, and indeed it is 
the only thing that could be done by him to support the 
check. The findings concerning it are clearly within the 
issues raised by the pleading and such findings support the 
judgment. 
CONCDUSION 
Having fully answered the plaintiff's brief, we submit 
that the matters complained of therein are without merit, 
and the pleadings, findings of fact, and conclusions of law 
made by the Court herein amply sustain the judgment ren-
dered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE S. BALLIF 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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